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By Edwin Brown Fir mage*
With the spectre of nuclear weapons acting as a restraint upon the nations 
in tenns of the levels and types of violence they will employ to achieve 
national goals, warfare since 1945 has undergone radical change.1 There has 
been no massive, overt aggression by one major power against another, 
although there have been half a dozen provocations which might well have 
led to international war in pre-nuclear times. NATO’s central front, the 
major focus of attention in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, is no longer 
considered a likely spot for open conflict between the communist and non­
communist world. After the Soviet Union had taken full advantage of the 
position of its armies at the end of World War II by establishing Commun­
ist governments in the countries of Eastern Europe, some of the early proto­
types for violence in our time emerged. The non-Communist Czechoslo­
vakian government was toppled by a combination of intimidation from the 
Red Army and subversion by Czech Communists. A similar attempt by the 
Soviet Union to intimidate and subvert the government of Turkey failed 
largely because of the success of the Truman Doctrine and growing Western 
solidarity. A Soviet-sponsored civil war in Greece failed because of the same 
factors plus a coincidental break between Tito and Stalin which closed Yugo­
slavia as a conduit for supplies to Greek Communists. Western support also 
prevented the Government of Iran from being intimidated into collapse.
At the same time, a civil war was taking place in China which would have 
profound effect upon the form violence would take in the post-war world, 
due in part to the belief of its architect that under certain conditions his 
pattern could be successfully followed in many parts of the world as “wars 
of national liberation.” An incredible end to at least one chapter of violence 
was written as Mao triumphed in his 20-year battle with Chiang Kai-shek 
over the mantle of Sun Yat-sen after suffering shattering early defeats. At 
first the Kuomintang  ^ with their strategy of encirclement and annihilation, 
had severely defeated the Communists. But Mao broke through Chiang’s 
blockade in Southern China and led 30,000 survivors 6,000 miles —  the 
famous “Long March” to Northwest China and the caves at Yenan. There 
Mao developed a theory of warfare based upon the dogma outlined by Lenin 
at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 and, more importantly, upon 
Mao’s own experiences in the war with the Nationalists. Although forced to 
realize the vast military superiority of the Kuomintang, Mao came to discern 
the political weakness of the Nationalists, who held the major cities but who 
had little effective control or support in the countryside where the majority
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Utah.
1See H. A r e n d t , On R e v o l u t io n  (1963), one of the pioneering studies on this 
transformation.
H e i n O n l i n e  -- 1 9 6 7  U t a h  L. R e v .  5 1 7  1 9 6 7
518 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1967: 517
of the people lived. Although his position was militarily weak, Mao had 
growing political support because of his rural work among the peasants,2 and 
from this situation emerged his classic pattern of guerrilla warfare: surround­
ing the cities from the countryside for a protracted war of attrition. His appli­
cation of the formula “the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy halts, we 
harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue” eventually 
demonstrated the weakness of the Kuomintang military giant which had no 
political roots in the countryside. This lesson demonstrating the primacy of 
political strength in relation to ultimate military strength was not lost on Mao 
or upon those who would later emulate him. After some years of guerrilla 
warfare in this classic pattern, Mao’s forces were strong enough to confront 
the Kuomintang in the more traditional patterns of encirclement and annihi­
lation which the Nationalists had used with such initial success upon the 
Communists. But with Mao’s support in the countryside, Chiang could not 
have in turn followed Mao’s earlier strategy even if the Kuomintang had 
been sufficiently perceptive and responsive to attempt it.
The explosion of nationalism must also be recognized as adding to the 
controlling concepts which were shaping the nature of violence in the post­
war world. As the forces of nationalism destroyed the remaining fabric of 
19th century colonialism in a shockingly short 20 years, some colonial powers 
resisted the nationalist forces while others peacefully acquiesced to the inevi­
table. The most anquishing dilemmas were posed to framers of Western 
foreign policies on those occasions when the forces of nationalism and com­
munism were merged to some indeterminate degree in opposition to “legiti­
mate” Western-oriented governments.
A more traditional form of violence, having similarities to the factors of 
nuclear weapons, Maoist doctrine and example,, and nationalism, still existed. 
Civil war, without communist or anti-colonialist overtones, also occurred as 
people with rising expectations and undiminished birth rates found that the 
progress they heard about on transistor radios and saw in the persons of 
foreign travelers could not be achieved in the form they wanted it or with 
the speed they demanded.
Can international law fashion a set of rules which could govern these 
several forms of violence? The traditional distinction between civil and inter­
national war and the different rules which follow the distinction are strained 
by the attempt to force such disparate types of violence into traditional molds. 
Tension is especially created by the interplay between two equally desirable 
goals. On the one hand, the interests of the United States and the future 
of international law and order would best be served if the United States 
avoided any “Mettemich doctrine of legitimacy” 3 under which we opposed 
any revolutionary change in the fashion of a resurrected Council of Europe 
with 20th century America in the place of 19th century Austria. In so doing, 
it is essential that the United States distinguish a civil war between contend-
2 See 4 M a o  T s e -t u n g , S e l e c t e d  W o r k s  190-95 (1963).
* See Friedmann, Law and Politics in the Vietnamese War: A Comment, 61 Am. 
J. I n t ’ l L . 776, 782 (1967).
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mg nationalist forces from an attempt by a Communist state to depose the 
non-Communist government of another state by some form of exported 
violence.4
On the other hand, it is equally essential to the interests of the United 
States, and I believe to the growth of meaningful international order, that 
we find appropriate means to oppose other forms of aggression. Democratic 
institutions which have had success in meeting blatant aggression must not 
now become immobilized, enervated, and separated from each other when 
faced with more subtle but no less dangerous types of aggression.
The primary problem, before deciding upon a course of action in response 
to violence, is to perceive accurately the nature of the violence and the 
identity of the participants. In analyzing these problems in regard to Viet­
Nam, the Department of State and its critics have reached disparate results.
I .  T h e  P o s it io n  o f  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  St a t e
The Department of State has noted that the Geneva Accords of 1954 
established a “demarcation line”  between North Viet-Nam and South Viet­
Nam and prohibited the use of either zone to “further an aggressive policy” 
against the other.5 The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (D.R.V.N.) 
violated the Accords by engaging in an “armed attack” against the Republic 
of Viet-Nam (R.V.N.). The Department of State interpreted several courses 
of conduct of the D.R.V.N. as constituting, individually or collectively, 
“armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter. This conduct included the development of a “covert political- 
military organization” in South Viet-Nam composed of Viet-Minh cadres 
which had been left in the South after 1954, in violation of the Accords. 
Kidnaping, assassination of hamlet chiefs and officials of the R.V.N., and 
other acts of terrorism were instigated by the D.R.V.N. and constituted its 
major aggressive action against the South for approximately five years follow­
ing the Geneva Conference.
From 1959 to 1961, the Department of State asserts, the D.R.V.N. infil­
trated thousands of southerners who had gone to the North in 1954 back 
into the South to join the Viet Cong in guerrilla activity against the R.V.N. 
The Department of State estimates that by 1964 over 40,000 guerrillas had 
been infiltrated from the North into South Viet-Nam. The findings of the 
International Control Commission are cited as partial authority for this 
proposition.6
Beginning in 1964, the D.R.V.N. began infiltrating increasing numbers of 
native northerners into the South, because of an apparent exhaustion of its 
ranks of southerners. At this time also, according to the State Department, 
regular units of the PAVN (People’s Army of Viet-Nam) began crossing 
into South Viet-Nam to aid the Viet Cong. The Department admits that it
* See Farer, Intervention in Civil Wars: A Modest Proposal, 67 C o l u m . L. R e v . 
266 (1967).
0 Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. D e p ’ t  of State, The Legality of United States 
Participation in the Defense of Vietnam, 54 D e p ’ t  S t a t e  B u l l . 474 (1966), reprinted 
in 75 Y a l e  L.J. 1085 (1966).
aId. at 474-76.
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is difficult to identify any one event or any fixed time when this mixture of 
clandestine and blatant aggression constituted an “armed attack,” but it 
insists that the “infiltration of thousands of armed men clearly constitutes” 
such an attack, and that the infiltration had definitely reached such a status 
prior to February 1965.7
In response to this aggression, the Department of State has argued that the 
R.V.N. possesses the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense 
recognized by international law and reaffirmed in Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter; that such right exists whether or not South Viet-Nam is 
considered to be a sovereign state or a temporarily divided zone; that such 
right, described by Article 51 as being “inherent,” is not limited to members 
of the United Nations; and that collective self-defense is open to states acting 
unilaterally or within regional organizations. On these grounds, the State 
Department memorandum concludes that United States participation in the 
defense of South Viet-Nam at the latter’s request was an act of collective 
self-defense permissible under customary international law and the United 
Nations Charter.
The memorandum maintains that United States actions prior to 1961 in 
supplying the R.V.N. with military equipment and advisors were within the 
provisions of the Geneva Accords which permitted replacement of existing 
personnel and equipment. With the withdrawal of French training and 
advisory personnel, the United States gradually enlarged its advisory and 
training forces in South Viet-Nam. Then, in response to “intensified” aggres­
sion, “increased infiltration,” and terrorism in the South directed by the 
D.R.V.N., the United States found it necessary to “increase substantially” its 
military personnel and equipment. Such action was justified, according to 
the Department of State, by the international law principle that a material 
breach of an agreement (the Geneva Accords) by one party entitles the other 
“to withhold compliance with an equivalent, corresponding, or related provi­
sion.” 8 The “systematic violation” of the Accords by the D.R.V.N. justified 
the R.V.N. in suspending its compliance with those portions of the Accords 
controlling the entry of foreign military personnel and equipment.
The refusal of the R.V.N. to implement the election provisions of the 
Accords is defended by the Department of State on the grounds that South 
Viet-Nam specifically objected to the election provisions at the time the 
Accords were signed by the participating states. Further, even if the R.V.N. 
were considered to be bound by the Accords generally, no breach occurred in 
the failure to implement the election provisions since the condition precedent 
to “ free elections” had not been met — namely, the existence of conditions in 
North Viet-Nam such that fair, uncoerced elections could be held.0
II. T h e  C r itic s
Various critics have taken opposition to every major point of the State 
Department memorandum. Both the origin of the hostilities in South Viet­
Nam and the identity of the participants are disputed by these scholars.
7 Id. at 475.
s Id. at 483.
9 Id. at 483-84.
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Professor Tom Farer10 has presented a somewhat jaded analysis of modem 
United States foreign policy, which he views as being counterrevolutionary 
regardless of the participants:
[W]e now see each revolution as a potential or actual battle in an 
immense, world-wide struggle against Communism. Thus, the signifi­
cance of every revolutionary civil war is grotesquely magnified, with 
the ultimate consequence that because we have decided that left-wing 
revolution is a threat to us, we guarantee that it will be a threat to the 
peace.11
Professor Parer’s central question relates to the identification of norms 
which will restrict the participation of third parties in civil wars. He identi­
fies four criteria by which to judge such norms: first, the chance that the 
norm would be accepted by the nations involved; second, the likelihood that 
it would reduce great power confrontation if accepted; third, the necessity 
that the norm be sufficiently unambiguous that serious violations are readily 
identifiable; and fourth, the capacity of the norms to facilitate geographic 
containment of violence.
Professor Farer maintains that the classical view (to which Washington 
“clings with rational rigidity” ) — that in a civil war’s early stages outside 
powers can only aid the established government — has lost its force since the 
emergence of a host of relatively powerless governments has erased any real 
distinction between the ability of legitimate and insurgent forces to maintain 
domestic peace. No new norm to limit third power intervention in civil wars 
will develop, according to Farer, as long as the United States “insists on its 
right to intervene in any revolution with whatever scale of force is required to 
suppress it . . . . ” 12 He rejects the most obvious norm, complete noninterven­
tion in civil wars, on the plausible ground that it would be unenforceable 
and unacceptable because of resulting ambiguity in the interpretation of 
training programs, economic aid, military assistance prior to the outbreak of 
internal violence, and the definition of civil war in general.
In place of the traditional rule regarding third party participation in civil 
wars, Professor Farer proposes a norm which would prohibit tactical support 
by a third power to either side engaged in civil war. No third party could 
send forces — be they advisors, volunteers, transports, or whatever — into 
any zone of combat Within the definition of “zone of combat” would be air 
defense installations, which could not be manned by foreign personnel.
Under the proposed norm, a country would be legally free to extend 
any type or quantity of aid other than forms of assistance which could 
involve its personnel in actual combat. There would be no justification 
for a state allied with the incumbent government to attack a state 
aiding the insurgents within the allowed limits; such aid would not
10 Farer, supra note 4.
11 Id. at 267.
“  Id. at 273. Professor Friedmann has joined in the attack on the Administration 
position, criticizing the “Mettemich doctrine of legitimacy”  which permits assistance 
to the recognized government but not insurgents. Friedmann, supra note 3.
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constitute an act of aggression against the country in which the civil 
war was being fought.13
The United States would have violated this norm in Viet-Nam at least by 
1961 with its shuttling of R.V.N. forces to combat zones in helicopters.
Professor Quincy Wright has concluded that the D.R.V.N. committed no 
acts against the R.V.N. prior to the United States bombing north of the 
cease-fire line which would constitute “armed attack” upon the South.14 
Therefore, no justification for the United States bombings in the North could 
be made under color of “collective self-defense.” Self-defense is permitted 
under international law and the United Nations Charter, according to Pro­
fessor Wright, only if an “instant and overwhelming necessity permitting no 
moment for deliberation” exists.15 He concluded that there was no evidence to 
support the assertion that organized contingents of the PAVN had crossed 
the cease-fire line prior to the bombings in February, 1965. Professor Wright 
termed “controversial” the question whether the infiltration by the D.R.V.N. 
of large numbers of irregular forces into the South prior to February, 1965, 
would constitute “armed attack” or merely “defense measures against the 
military activities of South Viet-Nam and the United States.” 16 The activities 
of the D.R.V.N. prior to 1958, presumably including acts of planned assassi­
nation of village leaders and other acts of terrorism, “did not constitute 
aggression or armed attack in international relations but civil strife within 
the domestic jurisdiction of Viet-Nam, similar to the action of the North 
against the South in the American Civil War,” 17 since prior to that time Ho 
Chi Minh had been frustrated in achieving the elections provided for in the 
Geneva Accords. Professor Wright concluded that “the United States 
response by bombings in North Viet-Nam, which began in February, 1965, 
violated international law, the United Nations Charter, and the Geneva 
Agreement, if the latter were in effect.” 18
Richard Falk has proposed that “internal wars” in which third powers 
have intervened be treated as civil wars. Response would be limited to 
counter-intervention, and third countries would not be permitted to directly 
attack the homeland of the intervening power unless the intervention were 
on the massive scale of a Korean-type invasion.19 “ [A]n intervening nation 
whose own territory is not the scene of conflict may not attack the territory 
of a state intervening on the other side.” 20 The alternative is to consider the
“ Farer, supra note 4 at 276. “The possibility of combat is the crucial distinction. 
Any entry, whether by land, sea, or air, into war zones i.e. —  any area in which organ­
ized units of both rebel and government forces are located . . .  must be prohibited.” Id. 
at 278.




"  Id. at 767.
mId.
19 Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War, 75 
Y a l e L J .  1122, 1123 (1966).
a Id.
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- act of foreign intervention of such importance that an internal war would 
thereby be turned into an international war3 the intervention being considered 
as an “armed attack/’ thus permitting an act of collective self-defense directly 
against the aggressor nation by a third nation. The consequences of this geo­
graphic escalation in the nuclear age, however, are so dangerous, and the 
interest of international law in restricting the scope and intensity of the war 
consequently so great, that a severe if not impossible burden should be placed 
upon nations seeking to convert an internal war into an international war 
“by characterizing external participation as ‘aggression’ rather than as ‘inter­
vention.’ 5,21 Former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is noted as sug­
gesting that indirect aggression not be treated as an armed attack by one 
country upon another.22 Professor Falk proposes, to build a stable interna­
tional order, that internal wars be treated as civil wars, regardless of inter­
a Id.
71 Id. at 1123-24. Professor Falk quotes a statement made by Secretary Dulles in 
1957 in response to a question put him by Senator Fulbright during the Senate hearings 
on President Eisenhower’s proposals regarding the Middle East. Hearings on S.J. 14 
and H.R.J. 117 Before the Senate Comms. on Foreign Relations & Armed Services, 
85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 28 (1957). Senator Fulbright was concerned about 
the wording of a proposed resolution which would authorize the President to “ employ 
the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the
territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation__” requesting such
aid against overt armed aggression from any Communist nation. Id. at 27. Senator 
Fulbright feared that the statement pledging action only against overt armed aggres­
sion implied that we would not use force in any other circumstance even though our 
national interests might be threatened. The Senator proposed a hypothetical situation 
in which the Government of Mexico would be subverted by the U.S.S.R. without our 
taking action. Secretary Dulles assured the Senator that action would be taken, but 
that response to subversion could_ take other forms than military invasion of the sub­
verting nation. It was at that point that the statement quoted by Professor Falk was 
uttered by Secretary Dulles. Id. at 28.
It is obvious from the context of this testimony that Secretary Dulles was talking 
of response to types of intervention far less violent than that committed by the D.R.V.N. 
upon the R.V.N. during late 1950’s to the present. The response which the late Secre­
tary would have made to clandestine subversion, propaganda, economic coercion and 
even acts of assassination would in all probability have been quite different from a 
response aimed at the infiltration of thousands of irregular and regular troops across a 
cease-fire line.
A year after the hearings quoted above, the crisis in Lebanon occurred. The level 
of foreign involvement was far less than what has occurred in Viet-Nam, and the 
United States response was therefore able to be contained  ^within Lebanon. In com­
menting upon this situation, however, Secretary Dulles left little doubt as to his opinion 
regarding the necessity of opposing indirect aggression with sufficient force to deprive 
the aggressor of his intended goal:
Indirect aggression is nothing new.. . .  Through use of inflamatory radio 
broadcasts; through infiltration of weapons, personnel and bribe money,- 
through incitement to murder and assassination, and through threats of per­
sonal violence, it becomes possible for one nation to destroy the genuine inde­
pendence of another.
It was in order to help to halt such practices that the United States 
responded to the urgent plea of the freely elected government of Lebanon and 
sent United States forces to Lebanon to assist that democratic country to 
retain its independence.
• • • *
The United States is convinced that if indirect aggression, in the form of 
fomenting civil strife or subverting foreign governments, is now tolerated as 
an instrument of international policy, events will indeed follow the tragic
pattern which led to World War I I -----
Text of Address by Secretary Dulles before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 19, 1958, at 12, col. 2.
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v en tion  b y  th ird  parties, p erm ittin g  “ a  n eu tra liz in g  response as a  m a x im u m  
cou n tera ction .” 23
In his most recent writing,24 Professor Falk has proposed that the “organ­
ized international community” (presumably the United Nations) give prior 
assent before a victim state be allowed to characterize indirect aggression in 
such a manner that “self-defense” would be justified as interpreted under 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This would greatly reduce the 
unilateral discretion of the victim state,25 the would-be ally of the victim 
state,26 and the executive branch of that potential intervening third power.27 
World order would presumably be promoted by this restriction.28
In order to understand a criticism of these critics, it is essential first to 
understand the nature of the hostilities in Viet-Nam and to establish a 
chronology of events regarding certain critical stages in the escalation of third 
power intervention in 1961 and again in 1964-1965.
I I I .  S u b v e r s io n , I n d ir e c t  A g g r e s s io n , a n d  W a r s  o f  
N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a t i o n  
A lth o u g h  H o  a n d  G ia p  a n d  others h av e  m a d e  s ign ifican t ch an ges in  M a o ’ s 
doctrin es  o n  p ro tra cte d  w a r ,20 th e  w a r  in  S ou th  V ie t -N a m  has to  d a te  b een  
a  classic ex a m p le  o f  a  so -ca lled  “ w a r o f  n ation a l lib era tion ,”  fo llo w in g  M a o ’ s 
m o d e l a n d  preach m en ts. A fte r  m a n y  years o f  F ren ch  co lo n ia l d om in a tion , 
w ith  F re n ch  in fluen ce  cen tered  a lm ost com p le te ly  in  the m a jo r  cities, V ie t ­
N a m  clearly  fit w ith in  Mao’s d o ctr in e  o f  su rrou n d in g  the cities fr o m  strong 
cou n trysid e  bases su p p orted  b y  th e  peasants. Mao’s ra tion a le  fo r  this p o licy  
is eq u a lly  a p p lica b le  to  V ie t -N a m  and  F ren ch  m ilitary  p o licy  th ere :
Since powerful imperialism and its allies, the reactionary forces in 
China, have occupied China’s key cities for a long time. . .  [the revo­
lutionary forces must] build the backward villages into advanced, con­
solidated base areas, into great military, political, economic and cultural 
revolutionary bastions, so that they can fight the fierce enemy who 
utilizes the cities to attack the rural districts, and, through a protracted 
struggle, gradually win an overall victory for the revolution.30
The long war fought by Ho against the French, along with the American 
bombing of the North, has aided Ho in turning nationalism into his tool as 
did Mao before him.31
53 Falk, supra note 19, at 1125.
Falk, International Law and the United States Role in Viet Nam: A Response 
to Professor Moore, 76 Y a l e  L.J. 1095 (1967).
'-*Id. at 1142.
at 1149.
” Id. at 1150.
28 Id. at 1140.
15 See B. F a l l , T h e  T w o  V ie t -N a m s  112—13 (2d rev. ed. 1967).
30 3 M a o  T s e -t u n g , Se l e c t e d  W o r k s  85 (1954). Those who propose an enclave 
theory based upon static defense positions around the coast of South Viet-Nam might 
pause to consider the Maoist doctrine of encircling the cities and fortified areas from 
the countryside, as developed by Mao and used with such success against the Kuomin­
tang, and the record of Ho and Giap against the French policy of holding the cities 
and highways and fortified areas, leaving the countryside to the Viet Minh.
31 See G. J o h n s o n , P e a s a n t  N a t io n a l is m  a n d  C o m m u n is t  P o w e r  (1962); H . 
Sa l is b u r y , B e h in d  t h e  L in e s  —  H a n o i  (1967).
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Mao’s influence on Ho, Giap, Truong Chinh, and others later to play 
important roles in Viet-Nam is unquestioned.32 Truong Chinh, then secretary 
general of the Indochinese Communist Party, wrote The Resistance Will Win 
in 1947. This was the first Vietnamese adaptation of Mao’s On Protracted 
War, with its famous three stages of defensive strategy, equilibrium, and 
counteroffensive, which Mao developed against Chiang.33 General Vo 
Nguyen Giap has followed Mao and Ghinh in practice and principle.34
That both Mao and Ho would like to export this form of conflict to border 
countries can hardly be doubted. Past and present conflict in Laos, Cam­
bodia and Thailand, supplemented by blatant statements of intent,35 clearly
“ F a l l , supra note 29, at 98, 99, 112-14. See also Sa l is b u r y , supra note 31, at 
180, 181; F. T r a g e r , W h y  V ie t n a m ? 206 (1966); Hilsman, American Response to 
the Guerrilla, C h ic a g o  T o d a y , Spring, 1967, at 34.
23 B. F a l l ,  supra n ote  29, a t 112-13.
31V. G ia p , P e o p l e ’ s  W a r  Pe o p l e ’ s  A r m y  (1962); Modelski, The Viet Minh 
Complex, in C o m m u n is m  a n d  R e v o l u t io n  185, 207-09 (C . Black & T. Thornton eds. 
1964); Hilsman, supra note 32.
“ See, for example, statement by Vice Premier and Defense Minister Lin Piao. 
Lin Piao, Long Live the Victory of People’s War!, P e k in g  R e v ., Sept. 3, 1965, at 9-30.
On November 1, 1964, the “Thailand Independence Movement”  was fonnally 
announced with backing from Peking and Hanoi. The purpose of this organization was 
to overthrow the Thai government and to sever all ties with the United States.
On January 1, 1965, the “Thailand Patriotic Front”  was formed —  again with 
the backing of Communist China and the D.R.V.N. — with the same objectives as the 
“Thailand Independence Movement.” In March and April, 1965, Peking announced 
the arrival of representatives of both groups.
By late 1965 and early 1966, guerilla bands supplied and aided by Peking and 
Hanoi were increasingly active in the Phu Phan Mountains of Northeast Thailand. 
After several clashes with Thai security forces, documents were found linking the 
guerilla bands with the “Thailand Patriotic Front” and the “Thailand Independence 
Movement.”
In May of 1965, the Foreign Minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, was on Meet 
the Press. The following exchange took place:
Question: Mr. Minister, the Chinese Foreign Minister tells us that Thailand 
is next on his list as a target for a Communist-supported war of national lib­
eration. How do you evaluate this threat, and how vulnerable is Thailand to 
the kind of war that is being fought today in South Viet Nam?
Thanat: It amounts to a declaration of war. When a country says against 
another country that “we will start a war,”  be it a guerrilla war or an open 
war, it doesn’t make much difference. It has been a declaration of war on the 
part of Communist China on Thailand. Now, of course, it is guerrilla war, 
and we are taking necessary measures and steps to meet the situation.
We didn’t take it lightly. We heeded the warning, the danger signal, and
I assure you that both the government of Thailand and the people of Thai­
land are doing everything to preserve our freedom and our independence. 
Question: What specific evidence is there of Communist China’s intentions 
to infiltrate and to dominate Thailand? _
Thanat: We start from a statement attributed to the Minister of Communist 
China, Che’n Yi, who said that the guerrilla warfare will begin in Thailand 
before the year is out. They have been trying to bring about the first phase 
of the subversive war. I’m referring to the process of sending agents, of 
recruiting sympathizers, of training cadres in Thailand, and of trying to build 
armed caches.
President Johnson has also emphasized the role of China:
Over this war, and all Asia, is another reality: the deepening shadow 
of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peking. This 
is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, attacked India, and been 
condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation 
which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The con­
test in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purpose.
Address by President Lyndon B. Johnson, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, April 
7, 1965, reprinted in V ie t  N a m : H is t o r y , D o c u m e n t s , a n d  O p in io n s  o n  a  M a j o r  
W o r l d  C r is is  324-25 (M . Gettleman ed. 1965).
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support this view. Since the basic steps in domestic and world revolution are 
identical in Maoist theory,36 what Mao did in China, according to Mao and 
his disciples, can be duplicated elsewhere under certain conditions.
For over 20 years, Mao has considered war between the United States and 
the Soviet Union to be unlikely. He believed that the major areas of conflict 
would be in colonial or former colonial areas outside the immediate spheres 
of interest of either super-power, and hence, in areas where the will of the 
United States to fight a protracted war would be very limited.37 Ho found 
that the same thing was true regarding the French in Indo-Ghina. Political 
support in France for the continuation of such a war gradually eroded, and 
the French Government found it politically impossible to send draftees to 
supplement the professional soldiers. Finally, Mendes-France was chosen 
Premier upon his promise to end hostilities in Indo-Ghina within 30 days. It 
was within this context of bargaining power, eroded further by the defeat 
at Dien Bien Phu, that the French began the negotiations at Geneva in 1954.
There are, however, doctrinal and empirical indications that, when faced 
with firm opposition, those who would otherwise instigate wars of national 
liberation might refrain, or might terminate such a war on the basis of some­
thing considerably less than complete success. After discussing the concept of 
defensive war, Mao says:
Secondly, the principle of victory. We do not fight unless we are 
sure of victory; we must on no account fight without preparation and 
without certainty of the outcome.. . .  Thirdly, the principle of trace. 
After we have repulsed the attack of the die-hards and before they 
launch a new one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that 
particular fight to a close. We must on no account fight on daily and 
hourly without stopping, nor become dizzy with success. Herein lies 
the temporary nature of every struggle.38
The Chinese Communists enjoyed geographical continuity with a friendly 
government, the Soviet Union — a factor which greatly aided their defeat 
of Ghiang. The D.R.V.N. enjoys the same advantage with Communist 
China. But if tumult in China continues and increases, this advantage may 
look less reliable to the D.R.V.N. Ho displayed a propensity to settle for half 
a loaf by accepting the Geneva Accords in 1954, when his battlefield position 
entitled him to much more. It is hard to believe that this was motivated by 
any real hope that unsupervised elections would be held after the imposition 
of a Communist dictatorship and the elimination of all anti-Communist ele­
ments in the North.39
It is clear that Ho Chi Minh had intended to take over Cambodia and Laos as 
well as South Viet-Nam following the Geneva Accords of 1954. By February 1962, 
North Viet-Nam had 10,000 troops and advisors in Laos. See Address by Assistant 
Secretary of State William P. Bundy, American Policy in South Viet-Nam and South­
east Asia, 52 D e p ’ t  St a t e  B u l l . 16&-75 (1965). See also Bartelle, Counterinsurgency 
and Civil War, 40 N.D. L. R e v . 254 (1964).
m See Janos, The Communist Theory of the State and Revolution, in C o m m u n is m  
a n d  R e v o l u t io n  32-42 ( C .  Black & T. Thornton, eds. 1964).
”  See M a o  T s e -t u n g , Se l e c t e d  W o r k s  97-101 (1963). See also B. F a l l , T h e  
Two V ie t -N a m s  117 (2d rev. ed. 1967).
33 3 M a o  T s e -t u n g , S e l e c t e d  W o r k s  199 (1963).
39 See note 102 infra and accompanying text.
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At this point the question may be asked whether a policy which limits 
response to indirect aggression and subversion to counter-intervention is a 
sufficient deterrent to those who would export their wars of national libera­
tion. The challenge we face is finding a means of frustrating wars which are 
stimulated by third powers^  while avoiding a counterrevolutionary policy 
which opposes any violent change even if it be of a completely internal 
nature. At the same time, the level of violence in any type of war must be 
kept below that level which could lead to a direct confrontation between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.
IV. C h r o n o l o g y  o f  E s c a l a t io n  b y  T h ir d  Pa r t ie s  i n  V ie t -N a m
Before evaluating the policies and pronouncements of the Administration 
and its critics, it is necessary to examine the record of escalation of third party 
activity in North and South Viet-Nam. Only from such a perspective can 
the policies of the Administration be meaningfully criticized.
The first major escalation of United States participation in hostilities in 
South Viet-Nam occurred in late 1961, when President Kennedy approved 
an increase in the number of military advisors in South Viet-Nam from 800 
at the end of 1960 to 2,000 at the end of 1961 and 10,000 by late 1962. In 
addition, American pilots carried South Vietnamese units to combat zones 
in helicopters and air transports and provided essentially every service short 
of the introduction of American combat units into action.
Prior to this escalation— since the 1954 Geneva Convention — the 
D.R.V.N. had been making provisions for the destruction of the regime in 
the South. Although the Geneva Accords called for the regroupment of 
Communist forces north of the 17th parallel, thousands of former Viet Minh 
troops remained in the South. In addition, large arms caches were deposited 
in the South for future use. Bernard Fall reported that the pattern of assassi­
nation of village officials from 1954 to 1957 indicated “a prima facie case for 
the existence of close coordination between the Communist guerrillas in 
South Viet-Nam and the North Vietnamese intelligence apparatus.” 40 
Roger Hilsman, a prominent critic of Administration policy in Viet-Nam, 
records the North Vietnamese actions which directly led to the decision by 
President Kennedy to drastically alter our participation in the defense of 
South Viet-Nam in 1961:
After Mao’s “East Wind prevails over West Wind” speech in November 
1957, following the Soviet sputnik success, the North Vietnamese reacti­
vated the Communist cadres who had remained in South Vietnam 
after the 1954 Geneva agreements, and began to use the old Ho Chi 
Minh trails through Laos to send down new cadres, selected from 
among the 90,000 southerners who had gone north in 1954. By mid- 
1961, the Viet Cong were estimated to have about 12,000 regular guer­
rilla troops, and they more or less controlled as much as a third of the
40 Id. at 23.
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countryside. Over 1,400 civilians, mainly village officials, had been
assassinated in the previous twelve months, and over 2,000 kidnapped.41
It was only after the level of infiltration from the North and the number 
of D.R.V.N.-directed assassinations and other acts of terrorism had reached 
such a stage as to seriously threaten the R.V.N. government, that President 
Kennedy acted upon recommendations made by General Taylor and Walt 
Rostow, following their mission to South Viet-Nam, by increasing the number 
of American advisors and providing support units to the R.V.N.
Even with the high level of infiltration of men and supplies from the North 
during the 1959-1961 period, President Kennedy rejected the Taylor-Rostow 
recommendation that 10,000 American combat troops be committed to the 
defense of South Viet-Nam immediately. Instead, American support was 
extended only by increasing the number of advisors, the commitment of heli­
copters and other air transport groups, and the use of American pilots in air 
combat missions as instructors for South Vietnamese trainees42 with instruc­
tions not to fire unless fired upon.43
In 1962 the International Control Commission reported that the D.R.V.N. 
had allowed its territory “to be used for inciting, encouraging, and supporting 
hostile activities in the zone in the South . . . ” in violation of Articles 19, 24, 
and 27 of the Geneva Agreement. It also charged that the R.V.N. and the 
United States had violated Articles 16, 17, and 19.44 The Chairman of the 
Commission, Gopalaswami Parthasarathy of India, stated, however, that in 
his opinion the United States and the R.V.N. had been forced to take action 
violative of the Agreements as a reaction to subversion by North Viet-Nam.45
From 1962 to 1964 the level of infiltration of men and supplies from the 
North increased. The Department of State has estimated that almost 13,000 
men entered the R.V.N. from North Viet-Nam in 1962, and that by 1964 
over 40,000 men had entered the South.46
During 1963 and 1964 a significant change in D.R.V.N. policy regarding 
the insurgency in the South occurred. First, D.R.V.N. control over the 
National Liberation Front became complete down to the village level. 
Douglas Pike reports that “in early 1963 well-known old-line Communist 
Cadres of the Viet Minh days, who had gone North, appeared for the first 
time at the provincial level and in August and September at the village 
level.” 47 In August and September of 1963 “at least two generals from Hanoi
41 H ilsm an , supra n o te  32, a t 36. For the A dm in istra tion ’s a c co u n t o f  the chronology 
a n d  n atu re  o f  esca lation  o f  D .R .V .N . an d  U n ite d  States p a rtic ip a tion  in  hostilities in  
South V ie t-N a m , see U .S . D e p ’t  o f  S t a t e ,  P u b . N o . 7839, A g g r e s s io n  f r o m  t h e  
N o r t h  404-25 (1965).
42 Hilsman, supra note 32, at 37.
"N .Y. Times, March 16, 1962, at 1, col. 5.
44 V ie t  N a m : H is t o r y , D o c u m e n t s , a n d  O p in io n s  o n  a  M a j o r  W o r l d  C r is is  
185-88 (M .  Gettleman ed. 1965).
“ N.Y. Times, May 26, 1962, at 1, col. 2.
40 U .S . D e p ’t  o f  St a t e , C o n c is e  H is t o r y  o f  E s c a l a t io n  in  V ie t -N a m  2 (u n p u b ­
lish ed  d o c u m e n t ) .
47 D. P i k e , V ie t  C o n g  : T h e  O r g a n iz a t io n  a n d  T e c h n iq u e s  o f  t h e  N.L.F. o f  
So u t h  V ie t n a m  117 (1966).
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arrived in the highland of the South to act as advisory or possibly com­
manders, in the N.L.F.’s armed struggle movement” 48 Then, in late 1963 
and 1964, thousands of North Vietnamese regular army (PAVN) soldiers 
were ordered to the South.49 In 1964 at least a third of the 6,500 (the 
Department of State says 12,400) infiltrators were North Vietnamese, which 
indicated a change in the previous policy of infiltrating those forces which 
had been withdrawn to the North from the South following the Geneva 
Agreements in 1954. By 1965, almost all forces infiltrated into the South were 
native North Vietnamese.50 The 325th Division of the PAVN was identified 
in action in South Viet-Nam by December, 1964.51
With this complete Northern control over the insurgency in the South, 
including leadership down to village levels and a dependence upon native 
Northerners for manpower, it is submitted that a state of “armed attack” by 
the D.R.V.N. upon the R.V.N. existed. Though many single events could be 
identified as constituting such an attack, including the infiltration of thou­
sands of PAVN regular troops into the South along with native North Viet­
namese irregular forces, this writer agrees with Professor Alford that “ [u]nder 
conditions of modem military action, an ‘armed attack’ may be regarded as 
a process and not solely a single hostile offensive event.” 52
With the increased pressure from the North, it became obvious that the 
government in the South was in danger of collapse. It would appear that the 
Administration realized the necessity of increased American participation to 
avoid this collapse: by December, 1964, American military personnel totalled 
23,000 men, although no regular combat units had yet been introduced.
After the Viet Gong attack upon American forces near Pleiku, the United 
States began “measured bombing attacks” upon military targets in the North. 
At the same time, Marine combat units were introduced for the first time to 
guard American installations previously defended by South Vietnamese 
forces.
While' the real reason for American escalation at this point was not the 
isolated incident at Pleiku53 —  of which the Administration made too much 
in order to justify its action —  the basic reasons for the escalation were 
impelling. As General Taylor testified before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, “it became clear [by February, 1965] that we could no longer
43 Id. a t  102.
43 Id. at 164.
10 Id. at 324.
01 U .S . D e p ’ t  o f  St a t e , supra n o te  46 .
“  Alford, The Legality of American Military Involvement in Viet Nam: A Broader 
Perspective, 75 Y a l e  L.J. 1109, 1113 (1966).
“ See Charles Mahr’s article in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1965, at 14, col. 6, where 
he reports that in terms of the size of the attacking Viet Cong force and the weapons
they employed, the attack on Pleiku was of a different nature than attacks in the past 
No evidence of Hanoi direction on this specific attack was found. That an American 
attack on North Viet-Nam had previously been planned is evidenced by the presence
of all three attack carriers of the 7th Fleet in the South China Sea near the Vietnamese 
coast, while the usual procedure is for each carrier to form the nucleus of a separate
attack force operating in different parts of East Asia.
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tolerate this clandestine support from the immune sanctuary in North 
Vietnam which served as the external base for the Viet Gong insurgency.” 34
V. A C r it iq u e
The challenge to international law is to identify or create rules which 
would at once diminish the likelihood of violent conflict between nations and 
at the same time avoid proscriptions which would establish a Mettemichian- 
type insurance for the eternal continuance of the status quo. From the United 
States’ point of view the rules should discourage third party instigation of 
“wars of national liberation” or any other type of civil disorder fomented and 
supported by third powers dedicated to violent evangelism on behalf of 
communism.
Professor Farer proposed a norm which would prohibit tactical support 
by a third power to either side in a civil war.55 Although a country could 
extend aid in the form of supplies and, presumably, arms of any type, no 
advisors, volunteers, or transports would be allowed in the tactical “zone of 
combat.”
The difficulty in formulating one set of norms to govern many disparate 
situations is illustrated by Professor Farer’s attempt. With the overwhelming 
presence of the war in Viet-Nam quite obviously serving as the nexus for 
Professor Farer’s norm, other fact situations apparently were not considered. 
One initial weakness is that it is as necessary to define civil war under Pro­
fessor Farer’s norm as under the traditional one, even though Professor Farer 
rejected the simple rule of complete nonintervention in civil disputes in part 
to avoid having to attempt this definition.
In addition, the events concerning Cuba, the United States, and the Soviet 
Union from the Bay of Pigs to the missile crisis present especial difficulty for 
this norm. There was an internal conflict with significant third power inter­
vention— the Soviet Union actively supported the Castro government and 
the United States extended erratic support to various insurgent groups. The 
transportation of Cuban exiles by the United States to the Bay of Pigs would 
represent a violation of Professor Farer’s norm. Yet the potentially far more 
dangerous placement of offensive missiles in Cuba by the Soviet Union would 
not represent a violation since no tactical “zone of combat” existed there, and,
51 T h e  V ie tn a m  H earin gs  172 (R an dom  H ouse ed. 1 9 66 ). F or other statements
defending and explaining the U nited  States bom bing o f  N orth V iet-N am , see Statement 
o f  Secretary Rusk before the A m erican Foreign Service Association, reprinted in  U .S . 
D e p ’t  o f  S ta te , P ub . N o . 7919 at 11 (F ar Eastern Series 136, 1 9 6 5 ); Statement o f 
Secretary Rusk before the Senate Foreign R elations Com m ittee, reprinted in  T h e  
V ie tn a m  H e a r in g s , supra at 11. Secretary Rusk’ s first public com m ent on  the 1965 
escalation was before the A m erican Society o f  International Law , A pril 23, 1965. H e 
stated that the U nited States was providing assistance in  the exercise o f  d ie  right o f 
collective self-defense under the U .N . Charter at the request o f  the R epublic o f  V ie t­
N am , and that “ [o]ur assistance has been increased because the aggression from  the 
N orth  has been augmented. O u r assistance n ow  encompasses the bom bing o f  North 
V ietnam . T h e  bom bing is designed to interdict, as far as possible, and to inhibit, as far 
as m ay be necessary, continued aggression against the R epublic o f  V ietnam .”  H e  said
that the insurgency “ receives vital external support —  in  organization and direction, in 
training, in  m en, in  weapons and other supplies,”  w hich  violates general international 
law  expressed in the U .N . Charter and the 1954 G eneva Accords. V ie t  Nam , supra
note 44, at 333.
“  See notes 12 -1 3  supra and accom panying text.
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according to the proposed norm, any type of supplies could be extended by 
third powers. That under Parer’s nonn, the Soviets could supply the Castro 
government with missiles but no Soviet troops would be permitted to man 
them, would further unstabilize the situation and make international war 
more probable. The suggested rule would in this case violate almost all of the 
criteria suggested by Farer as prerequisite tests for the norm. The likelihood 
of great power confrontation would be encouraged by the allowance of a 
supply of weapons which could be used against the territory of the United 
States; if the weapons were used, geographic containment would be virtually 
impossible; and the degree of ambiguity in the suggested norm which permits 
such a disparate treatment of two types of intervention in Cuba by the Soviet 
Union and the United States is obvious. Parer’s focus upon a “war zone” as 
the critical area in which outside intervention would not be permitted is 
unrealistic in an age of intercontinental missiles.
Professor Falk proposed that internal wars be treated as civil wars, regard­
less of intervention by third parties, permitting a "neutralizing response as a 
maximum counteraction,” with no action being taken beyond the initial terri­
tory within which the internal war was being waged.56 For Falk, the maxi­
mum response in South Viet-Nam, if indeed any response would be justified, 
would be a neutralizing counter-intervention rather than a response to 
“aimed attack.” 57
In an age when internationalized “civil” wars have become the predomi­
nant form of conflict, and when several nations have openly advocated the 
instigation of and support for such types of conflict, query whether the pro­
posal of Professor Falk would possess significant deterrent capacity. Is there 
any real deterrent effect when the worst a potential aggressor would face, 
when contemplating indirect aggression, is the frustration of such efforts? 
Must our entire military strategy in the age of international civil wars and 
wars of national liberation be reactive? If all the international gambler has 
to lose would be the chips he chooses to place on the table, foreign adven­
turers would be free to intervene with relative impunity. They would know 
that the maximum response from third party nations friendly to the legitimate 
government would be an attempt to negate the intervention of the aggressor 
nation with counter-intervention.
Nations which choose to intervene in civil wars within other nations on 
the scale that North Viet-Nam has intervened in South Viet-Nam should 
recognize that force commensurate with their aggression might be employed 
against their homeland. Surely Richard Falk’s proposal does not contain 
any sanction sufficient to meet Henry Kissinger’s definition of deterrence: 
“Deterrence is the attempt to keep an opponent from adopting a certain 
course of action by posing risks which will seem to him out of proportion to 
any gains to be achieved.” 58
Further, it must be assumed as a prerequisite to Professor Falk’s proposal 
that the “contending factions”  within a country are in fact indigenous to the
“ Falk, supra note 19, at 1123-25.
57 Id. at 1125.
“  H. K is s in g e r , N u c l e a r  W e a p o n s  a n d  F o r e ig n  P o l ic y  96 (1957).
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country. From that point it may be argued, as Professor Falk does, that inter­
national law may permit (or at least does not proscribe) the intervention by 
an outside state on behalf of an indigenous insurgent group when such an 
insurgency reaches some degree of stability.59 But it could hardly be argued 
that foreign support for a “contending faction” can be permissible under 
international law when that “contending faction” is first created and then 
directed, supplied, and maintained by another country. To permit one nation 
to first create an insurgent force within another country and then claim the 
right under international law to direct and support such a force since it has 
indisputable existence would turn the definition of civil war on its head. No 
more flagrant example of the bootstrap doctrine could be posed.
The most current information available to this writer would indicate that 
the National Liberation Front was created in the North and, though initially 
staffed to some extent by southerners who had gone North after 1954, has 
since 1963 been directed by northerners who in turn are controlled directly 
by Hanoi. Though the D.R.V.N. was able to exploit a revolutionary situation 
in the South, and though there are unquestionably many native nationalistic 
southerners in the N.L.F.3 it cannot legitimately be called an indigenous 
southern organization.60
Of course, if Viet-Nam is considered as one entity, this North-South dis­
tinction is meaningless. But to so do one must ignore the historical separate­
ness of these regions,61 the acts of recognition by over 60 states of the Republic 
of Viet-Nam, its membership in scores of international organizations, includ­
ing specialized agencies of the United Nations, and most important of all, the 
de facto separate existence of North and South under separate governments 
for the last 13 years.62
Falk’s thesis is sound at some lesser levels of intervention. “Subversive 
activities,” or indirect aggression of the scope to which Secretary Dulles was
Falk, supra note 19, at 1134—39.
60 See D . P ik e , supra n o te  47; U.S. D e p ’ t  o f  S t a t e , D e a l in g  w i t h  t h e  N.L.F. 
a s  a  Pa t h  t o  P e a c e  in  V ie t -N a m  1 (u n pu b lish ed  d o c u m e n t ) ; Carver, The Faceless 
Viet Cong, 44 F o r e ig n  A f f a ir s  364 (1966); C h a ffa rd , Who Controls the Viet Cong?, 
C h ic a g o  T o d a y , vol. 4, S p rin g  1967, a t 40; Fall, Viet Cong —  The Unseen Enemy 
in Viet-Nam, in  T h e  V ie t -N a m  R e a d e r  (R a sk in  & Fall eds. 1965); cf. J. L a c o u t u r e , 
V i e t n a m : Be t w e e n  Two T r u c e s  55 (1966); H. Sa l is b u r y , B e h in d  t h e  L in e  — 
H a n o i  159-74 (1967). 
w Fall states:
Viet-Nam, as a unified independent state, had again disappeared —  if it 
can be said to have had time to bloom in the few chaotic months of the Tran 
Trong Kim regime under Japanese protection, and of the Ho Chi Minh 
regime under Chinese aegis. As in the sixteenth century, so again Viet-Nam 
was divided into two distinct states, but from 1946 until 1954, this was to be 
a new, strange, urban-rural division rather than a north-south division, with 
the Viet Minh holding much of the countryside, including the hill tribe 
areas; while the French and, later, the non-Communist Vietnamese adminis­
tration were to hold the lowlands and, especially, the cities. In 1954, the 
“normal” north-south division of Viet-Nam was to appear again, only a few 
miles to the south of the ancient Wall of Dong-Hoi.
And, once more, the two Viet-Nams began to build their own separate 
institutions.
B. F a l l , supra note 29, at 77-78.
02 See Moore & Underwood, The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the 
Republic of Viet Nam, 5 D u q u e s n e  L . R e v . 235, 239-70 (1967).
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referring in his testimony quoted by Professor Falk,63 could be met by the 
response of the legitimate government within that nation or perhaps by 
reciprocal subversive activities against the subverting nation. But third nation 
responses should be limited to countering such subversion within the territory 
of the state of the legitimate government. However, at some point in esca­
lated intervention, surely by the time that cadres of troops and war supplies 
have been transported across borders or into a zone of a temporarily divided 
state, the aggressor nation must be faced with the possibility of a response 
directed at its homeland commensurate in strength with the original 
aggression.
Professor Falk has maintained that the classification of the actions of 
North Viet-Nam against South Viet-Nam as “armed attack” threatens to 
obliterate the distinction between international and civil war.64 Is it really 
“civil war” when the entire leadership structure of the guerrilla forces, along 
with a significant portion of the manpower and essentially all of the arms 
and munitions are supplied by a third power? Granted that “the war in 
South Viet-Nam should be viewed as primarily between factions contending 
for control of the southern zone, whether or not the zone is considered a 
nation,” 65 when one of these factions is first created and then directed, par­
tially manned, and supported by another state, it is submitted that this factor 
abolishes the distinction between international and civil war, and not a subse­
quent decision to classify a war as one or the other.
Professor Falk’s most recent proposal66 — that the discretion of the victim 
state, the potential intervening third state, and the executive branch of that 
third state be severely limited by prior “organized international community” 
assent to the characterization of covert aggression as “armed attack” —  is 
based upon one gigantic assumption. That is that there exists an institution 
of the international community with sufficient integrity and responsibility to 
be the repository of such power. Though I would wish that the contrary 
were true, I do not believe that the United Nations possesses such qualifica­
tions at this time.
Even if it is agreed that international law should place no prohibitions 
upon the right of a third state to retaliate within the territory of another 
third power that is intervening in an internal war, when such intervention 
reaches the level of North Viet-Nam’s intervention, however, it does not 
follow that such a response should be initiated. Factors of strategy and 
tactics, including the desire to limit the geographic escalation of violence 
emphasized by Professor Falk, should be carefully considered. But inter­
national law should place no absolute prohibition on retaliation by third 
powers because a potentially more unstabilizing effect would result from the 
elimination of a credible deterrent to foreign-sponsored wars of national 
liberation of the scope of the D.R.V.N. activities against the R.V.N.
03 Fait, supra note 19 at 1123-24.
" J i  at 1133.
« Id.
“ Falk, supra note 24, at 1142-50.
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Two factors which are related to this problem have to do with the initial 
decision to resort to counter-intervention in an internal war. (It is at this 
point that a natural fire-break occurs. It may be easier and less costly in 
terms of lives, economics, credibility and prestige not to intervene in the first 
instance than to abide by certain rules limiting the scope of intervention once 
it has been initiated.) The first factor has been mentioned previously. That 
is the decision to categorize an internal war as primarily involving contending 
nationalistic elements vying for control of the government —  in which case 
intervention is presumably not to our interest — or to categorize a war as 
primarily involving elements of foreign initiation and direction, leadership, 
manpower and supplies — in which case counterintervention is possibly 
within our interest.
One of the chief sources of frustration and dilemma for those attempting 
to analyze the struggle in Viet-Nam is that the factors of foreign Communist 
influence and genuine nationalism are so hopelessly intertwined. In Viet­
Nam, communism and nationalism are present in almost equal amounts 
even within the major personality in the struggle, Ho Chi Minh. Ho has 
fought those who were imposing foreign control upon his country, from the 
French to the Japanese to the French once again. As a type of embodiment 
of the spirit of his people, he has also resisted a satellite status for North 
Viet-Nam in relation to Communist China. Those who would characterize 
him as a puppet of Peking do a great disservice to others who must bear the 
results of such characterization in the form of political and military strategy. 
Yet Ho is unquestionably a dedicated Communist who hopes to impose this 
ideology upon most if not all of Indo-China. This record does not support 
the suppositions of some that Ho would be an Asian Tito if left alone. Conse­
quently, which element — that of dogmatic Communism with designs upon 
neighboring states, or legitimate expression of nationalism against those who 
would impose another form of foreign ideology — should the policy maker 
choose to characterize the nature of the violence in Viet-Nam? Either could 
be accepted — with substantial evidence to support it — as the chief charac­
teristic of this violence. The choice has largely determined the nature of the 
American response.
Proponents of the American policy in Viet-Nam are fond of offering as 
precedents our reaction to guerrilla war in Greece, intimidation in Turkey, 
and subversion in Iran. Opponents are offended by this comparison and 
deny its applicability with equally broad statements. But while in this writer’s 
opinion some similarities are present, the factors of internationally fostered 
communism and nationalism were not so hopelessly intertwined as they are 
in Viet-Nam. That crucial difference, it is submitted, goes a long way toward 
explaining why this nation is so dangerously divided over Viet-Nam and yet 
was able to meet the crises of 1947-1950 with considerably more unanimity. 
Today, either side may make its characterization with almost equal empirical 
validity.
The second factor which the United States must weigh before making the 
initial decision regarding counter-intervention is a purely pragmatic one.
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What are the chances of success? This may be determined by factors which, 
according to Mao and Lin Piao, are the prime considerations of the Com­
munist state that makes the initial intervention in support of a war of national 
liberation. Mao has said that “we do not fight unless we are sure of victory; 
we must on no account fight without preparation and without certainty of 
the outcome.” 67 Lin Piao stated that “[rjevolution or people’s war in any 
country is the business of the masses in that country and should be carried 
out primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way.” 68 Translated into 
our own jargon, and viewed from the standpoint of counter-intervention, 
this would mean that there must be a sufficient national and non-Communist 
base to politically support a non-Communist government in dealing with 
truly internal dissent, and also offer a national base upon which a counter- 
intervening nation could build, in order to help frustrate intervention by an 
outside power.
Again, in South Viet-Nam this issue is so close that men of equally good 
will and similar liberal instincts have reached contrary conclusions. On the 
one hand, many factors indicate that there are a significant and probably 
dominant number of people in the South who prefer living under a non­
Communist regime. These factors include the voluntary migration of almost 
one million people, mostly Roman Catholics, from North Viet-Nam to South 
Viet-Nam after the Geneva Agreements; the capacity of the South Vietna­
mese to bear appalling casualties for a protracted time and still continue as 
a political entity; and the absence of significant “Yankee go home” sentiment 
on the part of any major segment of the country, including Buddhist elements 
which are opposed to the government at Saigon.
On the other hand, no political figure or group has emerged who could 
serve as the nucleus of a government with which the people in the countryside 
could identify. No real political support in the countryside exists in favor 
of a man or a government, even though considerable opposition does exist 
toward the Communist North. This situation is dangerously close to that 
experienced by Chiang in pre-1949 China, when he had impressive military 
forces, some political support in the cities, but few political roots in the 
countryside. And as in China, the vast majority of the people of South 
Viet-Nam do not live in the cities. Diem was a legitimate nationalist and no 
one questioned the depth of his anti-Communism. Attempts to picture him 
as a French or an American puppet are completely erroneous. But his flaws 
eventually more than matched his impressive qualities. And no one since has 
had the stature or the background of fighting the nationalist fight against 
colonial powers. The southern equivalent of Ho is painfully absent. Without 
a man around whom the country can unite and with whom the people can 
identify, the chances of the formation of a stable government with true politi­
cal power are slim. And without such a government the chances of successful 
American counter-intervention are equally slight. We would be faced with 
the choice of perpetual presence or the rapid evaporation of a politically 
rootless non-Communist government in the South.
07 See 3 M a o  T s e - t u n g ,  supra n o te  38 .
“ Lin Piao, supra note 35, at 19.
H e i n O n l i n e  -- 1 9 6 7  U t a h  L. R e v .  5 3 5  1 9 6 7
536 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1967: 517
Again, the existence of such impelling factors on both sides of the question 
of the existence of a truly nationalistic yet non-communist society in the 
South make for excruciating political decisions for policy makers and critics 
alike.
This writer is in general agreement with Professors Moore and Underwood 
in categorizing the activities of the D.R.V.N. in South Viet-Nam as “armed 
attack.” 69 To this extent, the General Assembly condemnation of Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria, and Albania for aiding the Greek rebels is a relevant and appro­
priate citation of authority for the proposition that aiding rebellion in another 
country constitutes aggression under international law;70 the high level of 
terrorism in the South which has been initiated,, controlled, and directed by 
the D.R.V.N. constitutes aggression as well;71 and Professor Kelsen’s inclusion 
of supporting revolutionary movements in another country within the defini­
tion of “armed attack” under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter would 
seem to state correctly the better interpretation of this portion of the Charter.
Since the Charter of the United Nations does not define the term 
“armed attack” used in article 51, the members of the United Nations 
in exercising their right of “individual or collective self-defense” may 
interpret “armed” attack to mean not only an action in which a state 
uses its armed force but also a revolutionary movement which takes 
place in one state but which is initiated or supported by another state.
In this case the members could come to the assistance of the legitimate 
government against which the revolutionary movement is directed.72
Under this definition, the actions of the D.R.V.N. prior to their use of regular 
PAVN troops would have constituted aggression and an “armed attack.” 
After the use of regular forces, and absent justification recognized under inter­
national law, there would be no question but that an “armed attack” had 
occurred.
Even if the actions of the United States in assisting the R.V.N. against the 
D.R.V.N. are technically lawful under customary international law and the 
United Nations Charter, there remains a larger and perhaps more important 
question regarding the use (or non-use) of the United Nations by the United 
States from 1954 to 1966. Granted that, as Lauterpacht and McNair main­
tain,73 Article 51 only enlarges and restates an inherent right of self-defense; 
granted further that collective self-defense does not require prior Security 
Council approval;74 and granted that the United States technically met its 
reporting obligations to the Security Council,75 it was not until January 31,
69 Moore & Underwood, supra note 62.
50 Jd. at 288-89.
n Id. at 290-91.
72 K e l s e n ,  C o l l e c t i v e  S e c u r i t y  U n d e r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  88 (1954) (empha­
sis in original).
”  Moore & Underwood, supra note 62, at 299-300.
Hld. at 301-04.
M See Statement by United States Ambassador to the U.N., Adlai Stevenson, in the 
U.N. Security Council, Aug. 5, 1964, reprinted in  51 D e p ’t  S t a t e  B u l l . 272—74 
(State Dep’t Pub. No. 7710, 1964); Letter from Ambassador Stevenson to President 
of the U.N. Security Council, Feb. 7, 1965, reprinted in 52 D e p ’ t  St a t e  B u l l . 
240-41 (State Dep’t Pub. No. 7817, 1965).
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1966, that the United States through Ambassador Goldberg made a serious 
proposal in the form of a draft resolution to bring the question of the hostili­
ties in Viet-Nam officially before the United Nations.76 This writer does not 
doubt that sincere efforts are now being made to initiate negotiations, within 
and without the United Nations, through formal and informal means.77 But 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the United States has made serious 
use of the United Nations only when it became apparent that a favorable 
military solution to hostilities in South Viet-Nam would be either impossible 
or too costly, in terms of a prolonged and escalated presence in the face of an 
attrition of popular political support in the United States for such a war. In 
retrospect, one might wonder why the Soviet draft resolution proposing 
United Nations membership for both the D.R.V.N. and the R.V.N.78 would 
not have provided the basis for a negotiated settlement in Viet-Nam many 
years ago.
It may be that the United States, not without precedent in other times 
and countries, has over-learned its lesson of the late 1940’s that complete 
reliance upon the United Nations for purposes of collective security is not 
only foolish but potentially disastrous. Might it not be that at least within 
a certain limited area where the interests of the United States and the Soviet 
Union are not hopelessly opposite, the original suppositions of the founders 
of the United Nations regarding primary reliance upon the Security Council 
might be capable of fulfillment? With both the Soviet Union and the United 
States possessing nuclear weapons, with an increasing identity of interest 
between these countries to avoid the possibility of nuclear confrontation simi­
lar to that involving Cuba, and with a similar desire to check to some degree 
the aggressive tendencies of Communist China, it would seem that conditions 
for the fulfillment of big power unity are more nearly attainable now than 
they were in 1945.79
TO Letter from United States Ambassador to the U.N., Arthur J. Goldberg, to the 
President of the Security Council, Jan. 31, 1966, reprinted in S e n a t e  C o m m , o n  
F o r e ig n  R e l a t io n s ,  89th C o n g ., 2d S e s s ., B a c k g r o u n d  I n f o r m a t io n  R e l a t in g  t o  
S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  a n d  V ie t n a m  271-73 (Comm. Print, 2d rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter 
cited as Ba c k g r o u n d  I n f o r m a t io n ] ;  Letter from Ambassador Goldberg to Roger Sey- 
doux, President of the U.N. Security Council, Jan. 31, 1966, reprinted in B a c k ­
g r o u n d  I n f o r m a t io n ,  at 273; Statement by President Johnson, Jan. 31, 1966, 
reprinted in B a c k g r o u n d  I n f o r m a t io n , at 273-75.
77 See Goldberg, An Ambassador on the War, N e w s w e e k , July 10, 1967, at 56.
” In early 1957, the Soviet Union introduced a draft resolution proposing the 
admission of the D.R.V.N., the R.V.N., the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
and the Republic of Korea. 11 U.N. GAOR, A n n e x e s , A g e n d a  I t e m  No. 25, at 5-7. 
U.N. Doc. A/SPC/L.9, A/3519 (1957). Debate on this resolution produced several 
speeches by the Soviet delegate recognizing the de facto existence of two separate 
states and two separate governments in Viet-Nam. United States-supported draft reso­
lutions at this time called for the admission of Korea and Viet-Nam with the recog­
nition of the Southern governments, respectively, in both countries as representing both 
the northern and southern portions.
Though the Soviet draft resolution was never accepted, it does show, some months 
after the Geneva Agreements deadline on national elections in Viet-Nam had passed, 
that the Soviet Union was willing to live with the reality of two states in Viet-Nam, 
and that they probably never really expected such elections to take place.
70 See Firmage, A United Nations Peace Force, 11 W a y n e  L. R e v . 717, 727-37 
(1965).
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Though an accord would have to be reached with Peking and Hanoi, as 
well as with Moscow, the present tumult in China may make Hanoi increas­
ingly dependent upon Moscow for supplies and increasingly less intimidated 
by Peking regarding any desired overtures toward serious negotiation. Con­
sequently, opportunities missed in the past for a United Nations supervised 
truce might be capable of attainment in the future. The statement made by 
Moore and Underwood that the United Nations might have been utilized by 
other nations under Article 35 or the Secretary-General under Article 99 to 
bring the issue of Viet-Nam before the international body, even absent a 
United States draft resolution, misses the point.80 It is obvious that inter­
national institutional gadgetry cannot accomplish what the major powers do 
not want accomplished. That fact applies in regard to the United States and 
its attitude toward a settlement in Viet-Nam as well as to the Soviet Union. 
If Hanoi is finally made dependent upon Moscow for its continued support of 
hostilities directed against the R.V.N., and if Moscow and Washington both 
desire a settlement in Viet-Nam, the United Nations offers an ideal forum 
for such a settlement and various possibilities for its implementation. It offers 
no more than this.
VI. T h e  E l e c t i o n  P r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  G e n e v a  A c c o r d s
The Geneva Conference resulted in four separate documents and seven 
limiting declarations. These included three cease-fire agreements, one each 
for Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam,81 and a Final Declaration of the Con­
ference. The seven declarations were by Cambodia (2), Laos (2), France 
(2), and the United States (1). The cease-fire agreements were bilaterals 
between the Viet Minh and the Commander of the French Union Forces. 
The Final Declaration was not signed but was approved at the Final Plenary 
Session of the Conference, with the United States refusing to subscribe and 
issuing a unilateral declaration, and the State of Viet-Nam making an impor­
tant reservation to its approval.
The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference82 provided for elections 
in Viet-Nam during “July 1956, under the supervision of an international 
commission composed of representatives of the member states of the Inter­
national Supervisory Commission-----” These were to be “free general elec­
tions by secret ballot.” 83 The failure of the R.V.N. to hold such elections has 
been cited by critics of the Administration position as a major reason for the 
resumption of hostilities by the D.R.V.N. and a justification recognized by 
international law for such action. Falk has attacked the memorandum of the 
Department of State for its defense of the refusal of the R.V.N. to enter into 
negotiations leading to elections. The memorandum’s justification of Saigon’s
60 Moore & Underwood, supra note 62, at 323-24.
81 Agreement Between the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces in 
Indo-Ghina and the Commander-in-Ghief of the People’s Army of Viet-Nam on the 
Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, Cmnd. No. 9239 (1954), reprinted in 60 Am. J. 
I n t ’ l  L. 629 (1966).
82 Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Restoring Peace 
in Indo-China, Cmnd. No. 9239 (1954), reprinted in 60 A m . J. I n t ’ l  L. 643 (1966).
13 Id. at 644.
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refusal on the basis that “free elections” were impossible in North Viet-Nam 
at that time are rejected by Falk on the ground that the “meaning of ‘free 
elections’ in Communist countries was well known to all” 54 and still such 
provisions were included in the settlement The assumption made here, of 
course, is that such elections were actually expected by the parties and partici­
pants to be held.
Falk criticized the memorandum for its conclusion that under international 
law, North Viet-Nam was not justified in attempting to accomplish its politi­
cal goals by force when the elections were not held. He stated that inter­
national law is ambiguous regarding the breakdown of a settlement of an 
internal war,85 and that if the R.V.N. repudiated the Accords, the “principle 
of mutuality of obligation” would free North Viet-Nam from any proscrip­
tions in the Accords.36
While the Final Declarations called for “free general elections by secret 
ballot,” *7 Quincy Wright agrees with Falk that the knowledge possessed by 
the participants at Geneva of conditions in Viet-Nam precludes belief that 
they considered conditions necessary for the holding of free and fair elections 
as a prerequisite to such elections.88 Furthermore, the elections were such an 
integral part of the Cease-Fire Agreement^  says Wright, that the failure to 
hold them justified the D.R.V.N. in resuming hostilities. Ho Chi Minh was 
entitled to regard the holding of elections in July 1956 as being obligatory 
upon France “and its successor in South Vietnam, Diem” :89
[The] provisions concerning elections in the final resolutions of the 
Geneva Conference were considered essential elements in the Cease-Fire 
Agreement. This agreement, therefore, became suspendable when the 
elections were frustrated by one of the parties and the other party, Ho 
Chi Minh, was free to consider his obligation to respect the cease-fire 
line suspended and to continue his long effort to unify Viet-Nam by 
force.*0
Wright based this conclusion upon the assumption that Ho would not have 
signed the Cease-Fire Agreement in the first place unless he was sure that 
he could achieve his objective—-the unification of Viet-Nam under his gov­
ernment —  by means of the election.
Although Wright recognized that the R.V.N. was not a party to the 
Geneva Agreements, “France was, and the Diem government established in 
: the Southern Zone as successor to France was bound by them.”  01
1 One major and two subsidiary questions result from this conflict between
I the memorandum and two of it critics. First and most important, was the
M Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War, 75 
| Y ale  L.J. 1122, 1153 (1966).
85 Id.
; 56 Id.
ST Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, supra note 82, at 644.
83 Wright. Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60 A m . J. I n t ’ l  L. 750, 759 
j (1966).
33 Id. at 759-60.
3 90 Id. at 760. '
\ "  Id. at 762.j
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provision regarding elections really a significant factor in Ho’s decision to 
sign the Accords? Was the provision such an integral part of the Cease-Fire 
Agreement in the intention of the parties, that failure to hold elections sus­
pended the agreement? Second, was the R.V.N. a “successor to France” and 
thereby bound to honor the election provision of the Cease-Fire Agreement? 
This question is of lesser importance than the first, since if the provision for 
elections is not an integral part of the Cease-Fire Agreement, its breach would 
not provide grounds for suspension of the agreement in any event. Third, if 
the Republic of Viet-Nam is not a successor to France and is not bound by 
that or other conditions to the election provision of the Final Declaration, is 
North Viet-Nam thereby released from the cease-fire provisions under the 
principle of “mutuality of obligation?”
Bernard Fall has concluded that factors other than the belief that elections 
would be held motivated Ho Chi Minh to sign at Geneva.
It is still not entirely clear why the DRVN accepted the compromise 
of a “temporary” division of Viet-Nam inasmuch as the prospects for 
the holding of a reunification election within two years, as provided by 
the Geneva agreements, seemed fairly slim from the outset. Soviet pres­
sure on North Viet-Nam for the sake of improving Russian relations 
with France — more specifically, for the purpose of inducing Paris to 
block the creation of a European Defense Community including West 
Germany — may well have been the main factor behind Hanoi’s agree­
ment.92
The pragmatism Mao built into his doctrine of protracted war — that such 
wars should be temporarily concluded and consolidated rather than do serious 
injury to the country — has previously been mentioned.93 Fall has concluded 
that this same pragmatism is shared by Ho:
Another probable factor was the pragmatism of the North Viet­
namese Communist leadership. Ho Chi Minh has characteristically 
settled for a safe half-loaf rather than fight to the finish merely to prove 
a point. Moreover, the consolidation of Communist power in North 
Viet-Nam after four years of Japanese depredation, one year of Chinese 
pilfering, and eight years of scorched-earth war with the French was a 
formidable enough problem to tackle.94
Intense Soviet pressure and North Viet pragmatism seem far more per­
suasive explanations for Ho’s actions at Geneva than to think that one of the 
shrewdest revolutionaries of our century really believed that the government 
in the South would agree to hold elections the outcome of which would be 
fixed as much by Ho’s complete destruction of opposition in the North as his 
unquestioned popularity throughout the country.
Although Wright believes that D.R.V.N. subversion of the government in 
the South began only after the failure to hold elections,95 terrorism and 
planned subversion actually occurred from the time of the Geneva Agree-
33 Fall, North Viet-nam: A Profile, in P r o b l e m s  o f  C o m m u n is m , vol. 14, July- 
Aug. 1965, at 18.
03 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
M Fall, supra note 92, at 18.
85 ■See Wright, supra note 88, at 757-78.
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ment, mounting in intensity as it became apparent that no elections would be 
held, and, more importantly, that the South would not collapse as a result of 
its own problems.86
Again, any reticence to begin immediate, massive infiltration of the South 
can be explained more credibly by the necessity of consolidation in the North 
than real hope for elections. Ho and Giap were finding it easier to “blow up 
a water main than to run a water-purification plant, and to sabotage the 
locomotive roundhouse of Hanoi than to run trains on time.” 07 Ho was 
plagued with the problems of conducting constructive government rather 
than destructive guerrilla war; he was also following Mao’s advice of con­
solidation and his own pragmatic bent of not going to war again if the desired 
result could be accomplished by other means. But it is submitted that the 
failure of Diem’s government to fall apart under internal strain, rather than 
the failure of that government to hold elections, was the major factor in the 
timing of Ho’s increased use of terror, assassination, and infiltration in the 
South. When it became increasingly clear that Diem had established a gov­
ernment which, with United States help, could last indefinitely, Ho had to use 
means familiar to him.ss
That Ho needed a time of recovery seems to be unquestionable. The 
D.R.V.N. were unable to properly run the cement plants, textile factories, 
coal mines, and power plants." The government was chaotic.100 It must be 
remembered that while the 1946-1954 war with the French was a brilliant 
success for Ho and Giap, it was not the sort of victory that one could stand 
too frequently or endure forever. Their greatest victory, Dien Bien Phu, had 
cost them three men for every one lost by the French, and the overall Viet 
Minh casualties in the Indo-China war were three for each one of the 172,000 
casualties suffered by the French Union Forces.101
Fall’s description of events in North Viet-Nam immediately following the 
Geneva Agreement help explain Ho’s temporary preoccupation with the 
North and Diem’s reluctance to hold elections:
Following the Geneva accords, the DRVN settled down to the task 
of transforming itself into a full-fledged “people’s democracy.” A 
“Population Classification Decree” issued in March 1953 had divided 
the population into distinct social categories, and the regime now pro­
ceeded to eliminate all landlords by methods of force and terror remi­
niscent of the Chinese Communists —  and with similar results. Exact 
figures remain unavailable, but the number of peasants killed during 
the North Vietnamese “land reform” drives from 1954 to 1956 is 
variously estimated at between 50 and 100 thousand.
This brutal policy led to the outbreak, in November 1956, of a veri­
table peasant rebellion in Nghe-An Province —  the same region which 
had been the seat of the pro-Gommunist peasant uprising of 1930.102
881See F. T rag eRj Why V i e t n a m ?  115-16 (1966). 
m See Fall, supra note 92, at 138.
03 See F. T r a g e r , supra note 96, at 122-39.
03 F a l l ,  supra note 92, at 139.
100 Id. at 139-41. 
inId. at 129.
101 Fall, supra note 92, at 18.
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Whether or not Diem would have acquiesced to “free” elections, there is 
no doubt that such elections could not have been accomplished in 1954, 1956, 
or any time thereafter. After the new D.R.V.N. constitution of I960, elec­
tions were held in the North. They followed the familiar Communist pattern, 
with 99.8% of the voters casting ballots for 458 candidates who were com­
peting for 404 seats. In Hanoi, two tiny minority parties were permitted to 
put up a few candidates as long as they continued to collaborate with the 
Communists.103 Fall reported that the legislative elections held in 1964 
“brought little apparent change. . .  .” 104
The participants in the Geneva Conference did not appear to be surprised 
at the failure to hold elections. The Soviet Union introduced a draft resolu­
tion calling for the admission of both the D.R.V.N. and the R.V.N. as 
members of the United Nations after the July 1956 deadline for elections.105 
The British had favored permanent partition in the first place.106
The assertion by Wright that the R.V.N. is a “successor’ to France in its 
relationship to the Geneva Accords would seem to run afoul of the very 
definition of the term. Both France and the State of Viet-Nam107 were repre­
sented at Geneva, France as a participant, the State of Viet-Nam as an asso­
ciated state. As Professors Moore and Underwood have pointed out, the 
State of Viet-Nam had achieved independence and recognition from France 
prior to the Geneva Conferences;108 Foreign Minister Bidault expressly so 
recognized at the Geneva Conference.109 The State of Viet-Nam formally 
objected to the Final Declaration of the Conference and Dr. Tran Van Do, 
its representative at the Conference, refused to approve the Declaration as it 
stood and offered an amendment which expressed the intention of the State 
of Viet-Nam to abide only by the Cease-Fire Agreement.110 Prior to this, on 
May 12, 1954, he had rejected the proposals for partition of the country and 
had called for national elections after international supervision of the terms 
of the cease-fire. He reserved for his government “complete freedom of action 
to guarantee the sacred right of the Vietnamese people to territorial unity, 
national independence and freedom.” 111
Mr. Bedell Smith, representing the United States, refused to approve the 
Final Declaration but instead offered a declaration which stated that the 
United States would “refrain from the threat or the use of force” to disturb 
the Cease-Fire Agreements and would “view any renewal of the aggression
103 Id. at 21.
Id.
10*iSee note 78 supra.
10S Moore & Underwood, supra note 62, at 260.
1M The State of Viet-Nam was succeeded by the Republic of Viet-Nam in October,
1955, following a referendum vote. Ngo Dinh Diem became President of the R.V.N., 
succeeding Bao Dai as Chief of State.
103 Moore & Underwood, supra note 62, at 245—47, 337—38.
109 Id. at 337—38. No claim has been made that the State of Viet-Nam is a successor 
to treaties made by France since 1953. See 2 W h it e m a n , D ig e s t  o f  I n t e r n a t io n a l  
L a w  976-78 (1963).
510 Moore & Underwood, supra note 62, at 334—36.
111 D o c u m e n t s  o n  A m e r ic a n  F o r e ig n  R e l a t io n s  1954, at 315-16, 318 (Curl ed. 
1955).
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threatening international peace and security.” 112 Then, with direct reference 
to the provision for elections which had been rejected by the State of Viet­
Nam, the United States Declaration stated:
In connection with the statement in the Declaration concerning free 
elections in Viet Nam, my Government wishes to make clear its position 
which it has expressed in a Declaration made in Washington on 29th 
June, 1954, as follows:
In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall 
continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, super­
vised by the United Nations to ensure that they are conducted 
fairly.
With respect to the statement made by the Representative of the 
State of Viet Nam, the United States reiterates its traditional position 
that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will 
not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its 
declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure 
from this traditional position.113
This was a direct endorsement of the position previously taken by the State 
of Viet-Nam — that it would respect the cease-fire, but reserve to itself 
complete freedom of action regarding the holding of elections. While the 
Republic of Viet-Nam has recognized the legitimacy of the Cease-Fire Agree­
ment, it has from the beginning refused to consider itself bound to hold 
elections under the terms of the Final Declaration at Geneva.
The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam approved the Final Declaration 
with full knowledge of the position of the State of Viet-Nam. The only 
portion of the Final Declaration which both the D.R.V.N. and the R.V.N. 
recognized was the cease-fire provision. The D.R.V.N. apparently did not 
rely upon the election provisions of the Geneva Agreement in deciding to 
negotiate a cease-fire, and the R. V.N. are clearly not successors to the French 
regarding provisions of an agreement which the R.V.N. expressly disavowed. 
Finally, it hardly follows that the refusal of a nonsignatory to abide by provi­
sions which it had expressly disavowed at Geneva — those relating to elec­
tions— justifies a signatory in negating the one portion of the agreement — 
that relating to a cease-fire —  recognized as binding by both.
VII. T h e  N a t u r e  o f  t h e  U n it e d  St a t e s  C o m m it m e n t  t o  t h e  
R e p u b l ic  o f  V ie t -N a m
Secretary Rusk has frequently cited the Southeast Asia Treaty as the 
source of our commitment to the Republic of Viet-Nam. Speaking before 
the American Foreign Service Association in 1965, he said that when Presi­
dent Johnson authorized combat missions for United States military units, 
he “recognized the obligations of this nation under the Southeast Asia
“  Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva 
Conference (Miscellaneous No. 20 [1954] Command Paper 9239). Great Britain 
Parliamentary Sessional Papers XXXI (1953—1954), at 5—7, quoted in 5 D u q u e s n e  
L . R e v . 328 (1967).
1,3 Id.
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Treaty . . . . ” and “acted under the Joint Resolution of August 1964___” 114
The Secretary expanded on these views at his appearance before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee in 1966. He stated that under the Southeast 
Asia Treaty and its Protocol, a protocol state has the right to call on members 
for assistance and that “no doubt we are entitled to offer that assistance.” In 
reply to Senator Fulbright’s query as to whether we were obligated to do so, 
Secretary Rusk said that he did not want to get involved in the question of 
whether we had a legal way to avoid the commitments under the treaty. 
He stated that the United States is “entitled” to offer the assistance which 
was requested of us as a signatory by a protocol nation.115 Later he stated 
that we had an obligation of policy rooted in the treaty116 and that Article 
IV, paragraph 1 was the “fundamental. . .  obligation that has from the outset 
guided our actions in South Vietnam.” 117
The reticence of Secretary Rusk to assert any legal commitment of the 
United States to unilaterally act under provisions of the SEATO Treaty118 
is well taken. Both its terms and its history indicate that while the United 
States may take unilateral action in the situation presented in South Viet­
Nam, it is not legally obligated to do so.
Article IV, paragraph 1, states that:
Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in 
the treaty area against any of the parties or against any state or territory 
which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, 
would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that 
event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitu­
tional processes,119
The Protocol designates “Cambodia, Laos, and the free territory under the 
jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam” as coming under Article IV. An under­
standing incorporated into the Treaty limits the United States commitment 
to act in response to “Communist aggression” only, with the further proviso 
that we would consult on other types of aggression. Paragraph 2 of Article 
IV requires consultation by the parties on measures for common defense, if 
the independence of any is threatened in any way other than by armed 
attack.
During the hearings held November 11, 1954,120 Secretary Dulles made it 
quite clear that the Administration did not consider it essential under Article
IV, paragraph 2, that consultation take place prior to United States action 
when an “armed attack” occurred.121
“ Address by Dean Rusk, Washington, D.G., June 23, 1965, in U.S. D e p ’ t  o f  
S t a t e ,  P u b . N o . 7919, V ie t -N a m : F o u r  S t e p s  t o  P e a c e  11 (F a r  East Series N o . 
136, 1965).
115 T h e  V ie t n a m  H e a r in g s  11—12 (Random House ed. 1966).
110 Id. at 35-36.
117 Id. at 234.
114 6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170, reprinted in 60 A m . J. I n t ’ l  L. 646 (1966).
noId. at 647 (emphasis added).
120Hearings on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Protocol 
Thereto Before the Senate Comm, on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt 1 
(1954).
121 See the dialogue between Senator Gilette and Secretary Dulles, Id. at 35—36.
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The adoption in the SEATO Treaty of the “Monroe Doctrine formula” 
recognizing that an attack would “endanger its own peace and safety/’ and 
leaving each state to decide its own response “in accordance with its consti­
tutional processes” seems to represent a deliberate rejection of the allegedly 
“automatic”  response included in the NATO Treaty formula which provides 
that an attack on one is an attack on all. Individual discretion is allowed by 
the former formula.
Finally, Article IV, paragraph 1, provides for notification of the Security 
Council of any action taken. Secretary Dulles testified122 that the SEATO 
Treaty was based upon Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, relating to 
self-defense, rather than Article 52, relating to regional arrangements, and, 
therefore, no approval by the Security Council was necessary before action 
could be taken. Thus, under the Charter, the Council must only be informed 
of actions taken.
VIII. C o n c l u s io n
Both by traditional criteria of international law and by de facto existence 
as a separate and sovereign state, the Republic of Viet-Nam is a State sepa­
rate from that of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, which fact has 
received de jure and de facto recognition from a host of states.
The National Liberation Front has been created, directed and maintained 
by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, though a situation existed in the 
South which made that nation ripe for revolution. Southern influence within 
the N.L.F. has been increasingly muted and, since 1963, has become of rela­
tive insignificance in terms of leadership and control. Prior to the most sig­
nificant American escalation of hostilities in Viet-Nam in February of 1965, 
the internal nature of that war had been internationalized by the commit­
ment of native North Vietnamese regular and irregular forces in massive 
numbers. This drastic change in the nature of hostilities was sufficient to 
constitute an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
The United States has made tardy use of the United Nations by delaying 
serious attempts to bring peace through that organization until January of 
1966. The United Nations was not seriously utilized until it became clear that 
a favorable military solution might not be possible. This fact, however, does 
not excuse that organization from all blame since initiation need not come 
from the United States. However, in fairness it must be said that without 
receptivity upon the part of the United States and the Soviet Union, there 
would be no hope of any meaningful United Nations participation.
It may be that whatever chances existed for the use of the United Nations 
in settling hostilities in North and South Viet-Nam have passed. It would 
appear that the United States is now pursuing serious attempts to instigate 
negotiations through that organization as well as through other diplomatic 
sources, with little receptivity upon the part of the D.R.V.N. However, 
tumult in China, coupled with the possibility that the United States and the 
Soviet Union might be within negotiating distance of each other concerning
3=1 Id. at 17.
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a settlement' in Southeast Asia, might make it possible to use the Security 
Council and the Secretary-General in ways which were anticipated in 1945 
but not realizable until the present.
The enigma of events in Communist China may hold the answer to the 
possibilities of foreseeable negotiations. As the tumult within that country 
continues or increases, the likelihood that the Democratic Republic of Viet­
Nam will desire a negotiated settlement also increases. To this time, however, 
the critical pressure points of the harvest, nuclear development, and supplies 
to North Viet-Nam have not been visibly affected by the violence in China.
Basically, our commitment in the Republic of South Viet-Nam is not one 
in law.123 Rather, it derives from a combination of altruism and at the same 
time self-interest in preventing successful wars of national liberation, or Com­
munist-inspired wars of aggression by any other name, from being exported 
successfully from one nation to another. Though elements of civil war exist 
in South Viet-Nam, it is not civil war which the United States opposes. It 
is, rather, the attempt of one country to force its will upon another by vio­
lence— assassination, subversion, and in South Viet-Nam, infiltration of 
regular and irregular troops on such a scale as to constitute “armed attack.”
This commitment, however, is not irrelevant to law. For it is in the highest 
interest of all nations who truly love peace and order that one nation not be 
allowed to force its will upon another, whether by blatant and massive assault 
or by more devious and subtle, but no less fatal, means of indirect aggression.
123 See an impressive list of communications between Presidents Eisenhower and 
Kennedy with Prime Minister Churchill and President Diem, and statements of com­
mitment by President Johnson in W h y  V i e t n a m ? (Gov’t Printing Office, 1965).
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